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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1972, the New York Times quoted the New York City 
Correction Commissioner as follows: " 'All men are redeem-
able. Every man can be rehabilitated, and it's up to us in the 
community and in the field of criminal justice to see that this is 
done.' " 1 Today, few public officials would make such a state-
ment.2 Further, few corrections officials consider themselves in 
the business of rehabilitating offenders. 
Beginning in the 1960s and culminating in the 1970s, influ-
ential judges3 and scholars4 urged the abandonment of rehabili-
tation as a goal of punishment. Critics focused on both the 
philosophical and the factual failures of rehabilitation. They 
challenged the underlying assumption of rehabilitation that 
criminals were sick and in need of treatment. They criticized the 
practices spawned by the model, like indeterminate sentencing 
that allowed incarceration as long as necessary to "cure" the 
offender. They urged the abandonment of parole because it led 
to uncertainty about an actual release date and to unfairness 
since parole decisions were not based on meaningful guidelines. 
Critics frequently cited studies of rehabilitation programs and 
urged that rehabilitation did not work.~ 
In less than two decades, almost everyone involved in the 
criminal justice system has rejected the rehabilitative ideal, 
described less than twenty years ago as the predominant justifi-
cation of punishment. 6 By the mid-1980s, a major criminal law 
1. Tolchin, Malcolm, a Black, Named Correction Chief by Mayor, N.Y. Times, Jan. 
20, 1972, at 1, reprinted in M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 
91 (1973). 
2 . President Bush's use of the Willie Horton issue in his presidential campaign 
demonstrates the public's view of rehabilitation and the potential political cost of 
advocating early release for criminal offenders. For a discussion of the role of the Willie 
Horton advertisements in the 1988 presidential election campaign, see J. GERMOND & J . 
WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS?: THE TRIVIAL PURSUIT OF 
THE PRESIDENCY, 1988, at 10-12 (1989) (describing the Bush campaign's use of its 
perception of Governor Dukak.is as soft on crime). 
3. See, e.g., M. FRANKEL, supra note I, at 86-102. 
4 . See generally J. FEINBERG, DoiNG AND DESERVING JUSTICE (1970); R. SINGER, 
JUST DESERTS: SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT (1979); THE 
TwENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON CRIM. SENTENCING, FAIR AND CERTAIN 
PUNISHMENT (1976) (hereinafter FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT]; A. VON H IRSCH, 
DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976). 
5. See discussion infra notes 55-111 and accompanying text. 
6. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 23 (1972) ("There has 
been more of a commitment to the 'rehabilitative ideal' in recent years than to other 
theories of punishment.") (citation omitted). 
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treatise concluded that "retribution . . . 'is suddenly being seen 
by thinkers of all political persuasions as perhaps the strongest 
ground ... upon which to base a system of punishment.' " 7 
Critics of rehabilitation have succeeded in the legislature as 
well. Initially begun in the late 1970s, efforts to abandon inde-
terminate sentences and parole succeeded in 1984 when Con-
gress enacted the Sentencing Reform Act, 8 which set up a 
federal sentencing commission to promulgate sentencing guide-
lines. Similar guidelines were already in place in a number of 
states. 9 Several states have even enacted laws making parole 
unavailable for those convicted of certain offenses, thereby 
lengthening the minimum sentence to be served. 10 
This Article urges that we rethink our rejection of the reha-
bilitative ideal. In the first section, I review some of the major 
texts that led to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal and 
highlight the major arguments against the rehabilitative model. 
In the second section of the Article, I challenge the factual asser-
tion that rehabilitation does not work. An emerging body of 
expert opinion demonstrates that the picture is more complex 
than portrayed by those who urged the abandonment of rehabili-
tation and parole. In fact, rehabilitation works in certain set-
tings with some offenders. In the third section of the Article, I 
attempt to make a positive case for rehabilitation and parole. 
Critics of the rehabilitative model equated it with a deterministic 
medical model, its modem manifestation, and argued that it was 
inconsistent with other justifications of punishment. This Arti-
7. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 26 (2d. ed. 1986) (quoting Gardner, 
The Renaissance of Retribution-An Examination of Doing Justice , 1976 W1s. L. REV. 781, 
784). 
8. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as chapter II of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3621-3625, 3742 (1988) & 28 U.S.C.A. 
§§ 991-998 (West Supp. 1990)). 
9. See, e.g. , MINN. STAT. ANN. § 244.09 (West Supp. 1989); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. § 9.94A.Ol0-.910 (1988 & Supp. 1989); see also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 137-94 
(canvassing state sentencing reform). 
10. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (West 1989) (life imprisonment for 
distribution of heroin without benefit of parole); MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 45-9-10 I (1990); see 
also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 57-58 (canvassing state sentencing reform, he observes that 
"(e]ven a casual glance at the statutes that have already been passed in some states ... will 
demonstrate the acuity of those who mistrust legislative sentencing" because legislators are 
likely to enact Draconian provisions to assure re-election), 137-94. Some scholars warned 
that urging sentencing reform based on a theory of just desert would give legislatures an 
invitation to increase punishment. See, e.g., Clear, Correctional Policy, Neo-Retributionism 
and the Determinate Sentence, 4 JuST. SYS. J. 26 (1978). 
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conservatives were no doubt delighted when they were joined by 
liberals and radicals in calling for the abolition of the rehabilita-
tive model. 16 For example, Senator Kennedy wrote in 1978 that 
"[s]entencing in America today [under a scheme dominated by a 
rehabilitative philosophy] is a national scandal. Every day our 
system of sentencing breeds massive injustice."17 Kennedy's 
statement echoed the strong indictment found in the radical 
Quaker document Struggle for Justice. 18 Despite the Quakers' 
early role in establishing the rehabilitative model in America, 
the authors wrote that "[a]fter more than a century of persistent 
failure, this reformist prescription is bankrupt."19 
The critique of the rehabilitative model focused on a 
number of its manifestations: "The objects of this attack are 
sentencing discretion, the indeterminate sentence, the parole 
function, the uses of probation in cases of serious criminality, 
and even allowances of 'good time' credit in the prisons. "20 By 
the late 1970s, a startling number of books and articles endorsed 
a retributive, just-deserts model of punishment and rejected the 
rehabilitative model. 21 Authors disagreed about a variety of 
themes, including whether an offender's background was rele-
vant to measure his culpability, whether just deserts could be 
carefully computed into fixed sentences, and whether a just-
deserts model imposed a moral obligation to punish or was 
merely a limiting principle. 22 But the authors agreed that reha-
bilitation did not work and that retribution in one manifestation 
or another was relevant to why we punish. 23 
In this section, I do not intend to canvass the ongoing 
debate among those advancing the argument in favor of a theory 
of just deserts. Instead, I want to highlight the common critique 
16. In their introduction to Doing Justice, Willard Gay1in and David J. Rothman 
observe that the rehabilitative model has "always [been] under attack from the conservative 
community, to which it had appeared as a mollycoddling, bleeding-heart outrage, and now 
we (prominent liberals] find ourselves, for different reasons, with different motives, joining 
the argument for its abandonment." Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii. 
17. Kennedy, Introduction to Symposium on Sentencing (pt. 1), 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
1, I (1978). 
18. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 8 (1971). 
19. Id 
20. F. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL 8 (1981). 
21. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 4; see also N. MORRIS, supra note 11; 
STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 25. 
22. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 11-34 (discussing different philosophical 
justifications and variations of just-desert theories). 
23. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 28-29; see also F. ALLEN, supra note 
20, at 65-66 (identifying decline of rehabilitative ideal and Jack of new paradigm). 
1016 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
of the rehabilitation model by reference to some of the early and 
influential texts taking the model to task. 
A. The Rehabilitative Model 
The rehabilitative model has not always been associated 
with a deterministic medical model of human behavior. But by 
the 1960s, a growing faith in psychiatry and science had strongly 
influenced penology.24 Based on a perception of the criminal as 
sick and in need of treatment or rehabilitation, legislatures 
entrusted to judges wide latitude in imposing indeterminate 
sentences: if the offender is ill and in need of treatment, his sen-
tence ought to be conditioned on his cure. 25 Parole boards, in 
effect, helped to administer indeterminate sentences by deter-
mining when the "patient, was cured.26 
In the current debate, the medical model seems readily 
open to attack.27 Nonetheless, that it was recently a powerful 
model of criminal behavior is demonstrated by the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Powell v. Texas.28 In Powell, the Court was 
faced with a claim that the eighth amendment prohibited a state 
from criminalizing a defendant, suffering from chronic alcohol-
ism, for being " 'found in a state of intoxication in a public 
place.' , 29 
In a four-Justice dissent, which appears to have been 
drafted initially as a majority opinion, 30 Justice Fortas argued 
first that alcoholism is a disease and that " 'alcoholism is not 
24. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii; F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 7. 
25. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 89-90; R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 1-2; STRUGGLE 
FOR Jus-neE, supra note 18, at 10 ("Instead of building pride and self-confidence, [the 
rehabilitative process] tries to persuade its subjects ... that they are sick."); see also id. at 
40-41. 
26. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 87. 
27. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 25-41 (1964); M. 
FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 89-90. 
28. 392 u.s. 514 (1968). 
29. /d. at 517 (quoting TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. art. 477 (Vernon 1952) (current 
version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.08 (Vernon 1974)). 
30. As developed below, although Justice White concurred in the judgment of the 
Court, he agrees with the central thesis of the dissent, that a state violates the eighth 
amendment when it punishes a person for yielding to an irresistable compulsion. Powell, 
392 U.S. at 548 (White, J ., concurring). Hence, a majority of the Court subscribed to the 
critical aspects of the theory of the dissent, suggesting that Justice White may have changed 
his vote on narrow grounds after initially agreeing with the dissent. That view is supported 
by the style of the plurality and dissents. Justice Marshall's plurality opinion is shaped by 
his efforts to respond to the positively stated thesis of the dissent. Unlike the usual majority 
and dissent, the clear statement of the facts and issue are found in the dissent, rather than 
in the plurality. 
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within the control of the person involved.' "31 Further, he read 
the Court's earlier holding in Robinson v. California 32 as having 
held that "[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a per-
son for being in a condition he is powerless to change," and he 
characterized the addict in Robinson as "powerless to choose not 
to violate the law."33 While Robinson addressed a statute that 
criminalized a person for the status of being an addict,34 Justice 
Fortas would have extended its holding to Powell because "the 
particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which 
he had no capacity to change or avoid."3s The dissent did not 
limit the eighth amendment prohibition to status offenses. 
According to the dissent, an offender could raise an eighth 
amendment challenge if he could show that the act he commit-
ted is "part of the pattern of his disease and is occasioned by a 
compulsion symptomatic of the disease. " 36 
Justice White's concurring opinion demonstrates that a fifth 
vote may have been close at hand: "For some ... alcoholics I 
would think a showing could be made that resisting drunkenness 
is impossible and that avoiding public places when intoxicated is 
also impossible. " 37 If those alcoholics were criminalized for that 
conduct, Justice White would have found a violation of the 
eighth amendment. He, too, was ready to accept the view that 
strongly compelled conduct, the product of a disease but short of 
insanity, could not be criminalized. 38 He found the record inad-
equate to show that Powell "was unable to stay off the streets on 
the night in question. "39 
Other evidence demonstrates the strong hold that at least 
the myth of the medical model held for many observers of the 
criminal justice system. During the 1950s and until the late 
1960s, the D.C. Circuit initially expanded,40 and then experi-
31. ld. at 562 (Fortas, J ., dissenting) (quoting A. ULLMAN, To KNow THE 
DIFFERENCE 22 (1960)). 
32. 370 u.s. 660 (1962). 
33. Powell, 392 U.S. at 567 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
34. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660-61 n.1 (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 11,721 
(West 1964) (repealed 1972) (current version at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 11,550 
(West 1983)). 
35. Powell, 391 U.S. at 568 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
36. /d. at 569. 
37. /d. at 551 (White, J., concurring). 
38. /d. at 551-52. 
39. /d. at 554. 
40. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954), overruled in United 
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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mented41 with, the appropriate role of psychiatric testimony in 
cases involving the insanity defense. The court also faced other 
challenges that demonstrated the currency of the medical 
model.42 
Probably because of limited resources and doubt about the 
validity of coerced therapy,43 we never fully implemented treat-
ment programs in prison. Even in the era that demonstrated 
great public interest and confidence in rehabilitation, actual 
resources remained minimal.44 Given high hope and few 
resources, corrections officials experimented with drug therapy, 
psychosurgery, and behaviorial conditioning45-"methods 
which [would] alter criminal behavior patterns but which [were] 
minimally dependent on prisoner cooperation. "46 
Despite a lack of commitment of resources, the medical 
model had powerful sway within the criminal justice system. It 
influenced legal doctrine, from the role of the forensic psychia-
trist to the meaning of the eighth amendment. Further, it influ-
enced legislation and penology. 
B. The Critique of Rehabilitation and the Medical Model 
1. The Plurality in Powell v. Texas 
Justice Marshall's plurality opinion in Powell v. Texas 47 
articulated the concerns of those who later rejected the medical, 
rehabilitative model. He urged caution when the law attempts 
to import "scientific and medical models into a legal system gen-
erally predicated upon a different set of assumptions."48 Absent 
an available, proven, effective treatment, a chronic alcoholic 
41. See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 390 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (attempting 
to define "product" of mental disease to prevent medical experts from dominating the 
determination about insanity); Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1957) 
(establishing "but for" requirement for "product" test). 
42. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (rejecting 
argument that it was unconstitutional to convict the appellant of possession of heroin 
because he had "an overpowering need to use heroin"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 980 (1973); 
United States v. Alexander, 471 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir.) (rejecting claim that defendant's lack 
of control, caused by his "rotten social background," but short of legal insanity, should be a 
defense), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1044 (1972). 
43. Gobert, Psychosurgery, Conditioning and the Prisoner's Right to Refuse 
"Rehabilitation," 61 VA. L. REv. 155, 158-60 (1975). 
44. /d. at 158-59 (citing such practices as teaching only obsolete job skills). 
45. /d 
46. /d. at 161. 
47. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
48. /d. at 526. 
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might find himself civilly committed for treatment for an indefi-
nite period, awaiting treatment that cannot be provided.49 A 
prisoner gained little by having crime converted to disease if he 
could be incarcerated and treated until cured, especially given 
the imperfect art of treatment. so 
Marshall doubted what appeared to be an underlying 
assumption of the dissent that the purpose of penal sanctions 
was rehabilitiation. He articulated a doubt that would soon 
become obvious to all: "it can hardly be said with assurance that 
incarceration serves [therapeutic or rehabilitative] purposes ... 
for the general run of criminals."s1 
Ultimately, the criminal law's flirtation with the medical 
model proved too much. While the dissent suggested that it 
would limit its rule to a chronic alcoholic's compulsion to 
drink,s2 Justice Marshall was quick to challenge the dissent's 
attempt to limit its own principle. He characterized the dissent's 
statement that its principle would not be applied, for example, 
" 'in the case of offenses such as driving a car while intoxicated, 
assault, theft, or robbery,'" as "limitation by fiat."s3 The medi-
cal model attempts to explain behavior in causal terms without 
reference to the individual's will. But if all aberrant behavior is 
caused by "compulsion" or "exceedingly strong influence,'' 
there is little room left for the traditional assumptions of the 
criminal law. At root, the plurality was not ready to "cast aside 
... concepts .. . [of] moral accountability."s4 
The concerns articulated in Marshall's plurality opinion 
would soon be picked up by a wide range of critics of the reha-
bilitative model. 
2. Struggle for Justice: The Modern Quaker View 
Struggle for Justice, ss a widely read and influential working 
paper prepared for the American Friends Service Committee, 
presented a radical attack on the rehabilitative model. While 
49. /d. at 527 ("There is as yet no known generally effective method for treating the 
vast number of alcoholics in our society."). 
SO. /d. at 529. 
51. /d. at 530. 
52. /d. at 558-59 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
53. /d. at 534 (quoting id. at 559 n.2 (Fortas, J., dissenting)). 
54. /d. at 535-36; see a/so, e.g., S. KADISH, B LAME AND PUNISHMENT 103 (1987) 
(rationality of the actor provides basis for blame even where compulsion to violate the law 
is strong). 
55. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18. 
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their Quaker ancestors had been instrumental in developing the 
rehabilitative model, the authors repudiated that position in no 
uncertain terms. For example, in commenting on the work of 
Quaker prison reformer Elizabeth Fry, Struggle for Justice 
stated that "[although] we share her faith in the importance of 
.. . human reaching out to those in dire trouble[, t]his admira-
tion ... must not keep us from an honest evaluation of the long-
range significance of the institutional reforms she promoted. "~6 
That evaluation was harsh: 
Her work and its outcome is a paradigm of the drama that crit-
ics and administrators of the penal system have played over 
and over again: the critic attacks, devising something that 
seems better; the administrator co-opts the critic and imple-
ments the idea in ways and for ends quite at odds with the 
original intention. . . . 
. .. Much penal reform has been infected with . .. pater-
nalistic motives, which probably goes far to explain why most 
reform programs are so easily adapted to serve the perpetua-
tion of the system. ~7 
More specifically, the system of indeterminate sentences and 
parole failed because "managers of the correctional establish-
ment" used indeterminacy "as a tool of institutional control. "~8 
Further, they used indeterminacy to increase "the power of the 
state to lengthen a prisoner's sentence. "~9 
The authors identified a class bias in a scheme that empha-
sized making the penalty fit the criminal, not the crime: society 
thought the most serious forms of criminality involved, in part, 
the "challenge to the cultural norm[s]."60 The authors argued 
that "the significance of conventional crime - theft, killing, 
pickpocketing, prostitutions[,] robbery - lay less in the violent 
or acquisitive act itself than in its challenge to the cultural 
norm."61 
The authors saw the rehabilitative model as a product of a 
class society. That model ignored a retributive theory of justice 
56. Id. at 17. 
57. Id. at 17-18. As developed below, much the same thing might be said for the 
reformist goals of the drafters of Struggle for Justice . Their efforts led to the abandonment 
of rehabilitation as a goal, but rather than Jess incarceration, we face calls for more punitive 
sanctions. See infra text accompanying notes 96-99. 
58. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 28. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 29. 
61. Id. 
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because lower class crime was "petty in its direct costs" by com-
parison to white-collar crime, committed by "exploiters, who 
extracted hundreds of thousands of dollars from the defense-
less. " 62 A treatment-oriented system allowed the moral 
hypocrites to mollycoddle upper- and middle-class criminals 
because, although they are "morally weak and psychologically 
deficient, . .. they are not revolutionaries."63 Surely, a fallen 
member of the ruling class will need less reformative treatment 
than a member of the lower class who has not had the same 
advantages. Struggle for Justice thus aligned radicals with law-
and-order advocates in their distaste for parole and rehabilita-
tion. For radicals, these systems were shams through which 
society favored the rich over the poor. 
Efforts at reform were viewed as paternalistic and coercive. 
By what moral right did a corrupt society attempt to reform rev-
olutionaries?64 Many observers were quick to agree: we wit-
nessed the criminalization of civil rights workers in the South 
and draft resisters throughout the United States. 65 These were 
people of conscience, political dissidents with the strength of 
conviction to face violence and imprisonment based on profound 
religious and moral convictions. Such people of conscience 
might be willing to accept their just deserts for violating the law, 
but they certainly were not suitable subjects for reformation and 
rehabilitation. Struggle for Justice did not attempt to distinguish 
crimes of violence, like robbery, from crimes of conscience. 66 
What made Struggle for Justice a compelling document, 
cited by numerous less radical commentators who picked up its 
reformist spirit, 67 was not only its passionate political critique. 
After all, it was advocating abandonment of a positive view of 
humanity, the belief in our capacity for reform or transforma-
62. /d. at 30. The analysis ignores the psychological cost of crimes of violence 
against the victim. The 1970s and 1980s also saw heightened attention to the victims of 
violent crime, powerful voices that would increase pressure to punish criminal offenders. 
See, e.g., F. CARRINGTON, THE VICTIMS (1975); S. EsTRJCH, REAL RAPE (1987); L. 
WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME (1984). 
63. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 30. 
64. See, e.g., id. at 100-23 (discussing repressive function of the criminal law). 
65. See, e.g., Gay lin & Rothman, supra note 17, at xxxili; R . SINGER, supra note 4, at 
6. 
66. See STRUGGLE FOR JuSTICE, supra note 18, at 29-31 (analysis on basis of class, 
rather than on whether crime had a victim). 
67. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 8 n.22; FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, 
supra note 4, at 98 n.20; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 4 n.6; Dershowitz, Indeterminate 
Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the Harm , 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 301 n .8 (1974). 
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tion from evil to good, reflected in the early conception of reha-
bilitation. Ultimately, Struggle for Justice was compelling 
because it could point to the empirical propostion that parole 
and rehabilitation simply did not work. 68 
3. Judge Frankel's Criminal Sentences: A Moderate Critique 
Judge Marvin Frankel's Criminal Sentences 69 espoused 
many of the same themes articulated in Struggle for Justice, but 
in a more moderate voice. He did not articulate the same 
assumptions about the class structure of the criminal justice sys-
tem. But he too used powerful rhetoric to describe the rehabili-
tative system. He portrayed "evils [that] ... are grim[,] ... 
unbearable by any society that styles itself civilized."70 
The first evil was "the almost wholly unchecked and sweep-
ing powers we give to judges in the fashioning of sentences[,] ... 
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule of 
law."71 Sentencing judges were not only given wide latitude in 
choosing a sentence, but they were also given no guidance in 
how to exercise that discretion. 72 
Criminal Sentences tied the lack of guidance to a funda-
mental failure of Congress and state legislatures to ask "the most 
basic of the questions affecting criminal penalties, the questions 
of justification and purpose."73 Thus, judges were free to deter-
mine a sentence based on their own ideas about why we punish. 
Frankel and others have doubted that judges have adequate 
training or time to make principled sentencing decisions. 74 The 
result of the then-applicable scheme was not surprising: 
"untrained, untested, unsupervised men armed with great power 
will perpetrate abuses. "75 Potential for abuse was further com-
pounded by "walls of silence," "[t]he absence of any explanation 
68. See STRUGGLE FOR }US"r!CE, supra note 18, at 83-99. 
69. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1. 
70. /d. at ix. 
71. /d. at S. 
72. /d. at 7. 
73. /d. Even where legislatures do state purposes of punishment, problems remain: 
for example, a sentencing judge or commission must deal with situations in which those 
purposes conflict. One of the best examples of such a conflict is found in an articulate 
opinion by Judge Frankel in United States v. Bergman, 416 F . Supp. 496 (S.D .N.Y. 1976). 
Frankel found no need to incarcerate for specific deterrence, but felt compelled by other 
purposes of punishment to sentence the 64-year-old defendant to a term of imprisonment. 
74. M. FRANKEL, supra note I, ch. 2. 
75. /d. at 17. 
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or purported justification for the sentence. " 76 
Frankel singled out indeterminate sentences for special crit-
icism. While recognizing that "[t)he case for the indeterminate 
sentence rests .. . upon a laudable concern for each unique indi-
vidual, "77 he rejected the idea of criminals as "sick" and in need 
of a "cure," as "genetically flawed and malformed."78 He dis-
puted the idea that many normal criminals are fit candidates for 
treatment. More importantly, he doubted the existence of a cure 
for the disease, making suspect indeterminate sentences that 
incarcerate until the sick prisoner is cured. 79 Lacking a treat-
ment, society is simply warehousing prisoners, who instead of 
being cured, are made worse. 80 
Frankel identified the cynical belief among prisoners that 
the system of parole was largely political. That concern was 
especially true in light of the lack of guidelines for parole 
officers, who are "assigned without guidance to answer unintel-
ligible questions . . . . We charge [parole boards] to make inde-
terminate sentences determinate, but we give them no 
conceptual or other tools to work with. We set them lofty goals 
of rehabilitation, but with no directions or means of achieve-
ment. " 81 The result is rage and cynicism among the "alleged 
beneficiaries of the rehabilitative ideal. " 82 The system leaves 
them unable to plan their time or to discover the rules on how to 
secure their release. 83 
Judge Frankel did not deny the possibility that some offend-
ers might be rehabilitated. But he rejected the idea that all pris-
oners were capable of redemption or transformation. 84 
Having portrayed a system sufficiently arbitrary to raise 
questions about its constitutionality, 8s Judge Frankel devoted his 
final chapter to a proposal for legislative reform. His specific 
proposals provided a game plan for Congress when it eventually 
created a sentencing commission and empowered it to set up 
76. /d. at 42-43. 
77. /d. at 89. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. at 90-91. 
80. /d. at 93. 
81. /d. at 95. 
82. /d. at 96. 
83. Id. at 97. 
84. /d. at 91. 
85. /d. at 103. 
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sentencing guidelines.86 Judge Frankel urged articulation of 
purposes of punishment, 87 adoption of weights and measures of 
factors to determine a sentence, 88 and creation of a permanent 
sentencing commission. 89 Unlike Congress when it eventually 
passed sentencing reform, 90 and unlike many commentators 
including the authors of Struggle for Justice,91 Frankel did not 
urge wholesale abandonment of indeterminate sentences. He 
specifically observed that in limited contexts rehabilitation and 
indeterminate sentences serve a function. 92 
4. Doing Justice 
By the mid-1970s, a strong coalition was in place that 
would soon challenge the supremacy of the rehabilitative, medi-
cal model. Picking up many of the themes in Struggle for Justice 
and Criminal Sentences, Doing Justice set the framework for the 
debate about punishment over the past decade. 
The committee that prepared Doing Justice consisted of 
some of the day,s most influential liberals. 93 Although done 
with regrets, they recommended the abandonment of the reha-
bilitative model. 94 They did so for several reasons. The model 
was riddled with internal inconsistencies. They preferred a just-
deserts model because "[c]ertain things are simply wrong and 
ought to be punished.,9 s It is doubtful, however, that they 
would have abandoned the rehabilitative model on philosophical 
grounds alone. They hesitated to tum their backs on "consider-
ations [of] generosity and charity, compassion and love,,96 that 
they believed were reflected in the rehabilitative ideal. 
86. Lindeman, Opening the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to Alternatives, 15 WM. 
MITCHELL L. REv. 555, 556 (1989). 
87. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 106. 
88. /d. at 111-15. 
89. /d. at 118-24. 
90. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b) (West Supp. 1990). At the same time that Congress 
rejected rehabilitation as the sole basis for sentencing policy, it recognized rehabilitation as 
a valid purpose of punishment. /d. § 3553(a)(2)(D). But in the scheme developed by 
Congress, amenability to treatment is assessed at the time of sentencing and the scheme 
rejects considerations of events subsequent to conviction and incarceration. 
91. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 144 (urging fixed sentences, thereby 
eliminating "discretion in setting sentences"). 
92. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 99-100. 
93. See Gaylin & Rothman, supra note II, at vii-ix (listing members of the 
committee). 
94. /d. at xxxvii. 
95. /d. at xxxix; see also A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 45-55. 
96. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxix. 
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The committee was deeply troubled by pragmatic consider-
ations. The rehabilitative model "produced unexpected abhor-
rent consequences and numerous unpredicted side effects that 
were less humane or liberal than its proponents had antici-
pated."97 Outward benevolence led to exploitation of prisoners 
in practice. The model led to gross inequities in the length of 
criminal sentences for similar conduct. 98 Perhaps most telling in 
the committee's view was "[t]he simple fact ... that the experi-
ment has not worked out. "99 
The committee's chapter on rehabilitation programs was 
almost as pessimistic as the view of Struggle for Justice. They 
rejected the idea that we can blame the failure of rehabilitation 
on a lack of resources. Results were discouraging even in juris-
dictions like California where programs were "seriously 
thought-out and well financed." 100 The committee reviewed a 
comprehensive list of treatment programs and concluded not 
only that "[t]he quality of many programs has been poor," but 
that even where that has not been the case, results have not been 
encouraging. 101 They reached their conclusions by examining 
their own study, as well as published reports, including the 
widely cited works of Robert Martinson. 102 They also doubted 
the efficacy of intrusive behavior-control methods and rejected 
them on moral grounds even if those methods proved 
effective. 103 
The committee rejected rehabilitation as the primary justifi-
cation of punishment. They argued that deterrence was not a 
sufficient justification of punishment, although it was indeed rel-
evant "in justifying the existence of the criminal sanction." 104 
Ultimately, they endorsed the notion of just deserts and con-
cluded that "[t]hose who violate others' rights deserve 
punishment." 105 
When they turned to the question of allocation of punish-
97. /d. at xxxvii. 
98. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 101. 
99. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxviii. 
!()(). A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 13. 
101. /d. at 15. 
102. /d. at 152-53 n.4; see also R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing Martinson's 
works); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 74 n.16 (discussing 
Martinson's conclusion that little works). 
103. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 17. 
104. /d. at 61. 
105. /d. at 54. 
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ment, as opposed to the justification for punishing, the commit-
tee again argued for a theory of just deserts. 106 Unlike 
retributivists who would look only to the harm caused, 107 they 
believed that the punishment should be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the wrong and that it was to be measured "by the 
act and ... the degree of the actor's culpability."108 Doing Jus-
tice argued that commensurate deserts determined upper and 
lower limits of punishment. To use a theory of just deserts as 
setting only an upper limit would create unfairness by treating 
some offenders too leniently.109 
The just-deserts model, according to the committee, is at 
odds with rehabilitation. Punishment is moralistic and judg-
mental, while the rehabilitative model demonstrates mercy and 
leniency.110 
The texts discussed were not the only influential texts urg-
ing a re-examination of punishment and rehabilitation. 111 They 
do, however, reflect the unusual political alliance that- soon led 
to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal. They also reflect 
the common themes in the argument against rehabilitation: 
treated as synonymous with the medical model, it was based on 
mercy, not justice and, therefore, was inconsistent with the crim-
inal law. The model was thus grounded on an erroneous philo-
sophical premise: we do not punish out of beneficence, but 
because the punishment is deserved. The rehabilitative model 
had also led to indecent inequities in sentencing. Equally impor-
tant, the common perception was that rehabilitation was a cruel 
joke because efforts at rehabilitation were inadequate and, even 
when provided, those efforts simply did not work. 
106. /d. at 66-76. 
107. /d. at 68. For an insightful discussion of the role of resulting harm in 
substantive criminal law and in sentencing policy, see generally Schulhofer, Harm and 
Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 
U. PA. L. REv. 1497 (1974). 
108. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 69. Demonstrating the popular appeal of this 
view of retribution or just deserts, the Supreme Court has adopted a similar view of eighth 
amendment proportionality. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284-86 (1983). 
109. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 73. 
110. Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvii-xl. 
111 . A bibliography of other related texts can be found in R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 
205-11. 
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III. LEGISLATIVE ABANDONMENT OF THE REHABILITATIVE 
MODEL 
A. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
By the end of the 1970s, efforts at sentencing reform were 
underway.112 Within the federal system, after an unsuccessful 
attempt to pass legislation in the late 1970s, Congress enacted 
the Sentencing Reform Act (the Act) as part of the 1984 Com-
prehensive Crime Control Act. 113 That legislation reflects the 
critical view of the rehabilitative model and indeterminate sen-
tencing developed above. 
In place of the previous individualized sentencing approach, 
the act establishes more determinate or presumptive 
sentences. 114 For a given category of offense committed by a 
given category of offender, the judge is required to rely on sen-
tencing guidelines to determine an appropriate kind and range of 
sentence. 115 The court may deviate from that range only if it 
finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances not considered in 
the guideline formulation. 116 If the judge imposes a sentence dis-
parate with the guidelines, he must state the reasons for which 
he imposed the sentence. 117 The sentence then becomes subject 
to appellate review.118 
Also in line with the criticism of the rehabilitative model, 
Congress eliminated parole. 119 Because the impetus for the Act 
was to make the offender's sentence more definite, retention of 
parole would re-introduce an element of uncertainty that the 
system was designed to eliminate. 12° Critics of rehabilitation 
had argued that prisoners were victimized by uncertainty about 
their release date and were subjected to arbitrary treatment 
because parole board decisions were unguided by standards. 121 
112. An earlier effort at reform is discussed in Kennedy, supra note 17. 
113. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was enacted as chapter II of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1988 (1984); see 
supra note 8. 
114. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 367-68 (1989). 
115. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CoDE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS 3220, 3234. 
116. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990). 
117. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988). 
118. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(a)-(b) (West 1985 & Supp. 1990). 
119. /d. § 3624(a)-(b) (a prisoner must complete his sentence, reduced only by 
limited "good" time). 
120. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 53, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CoNG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 3236. 
121. L. GOODSTEIN & J. HEPBURN, DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND 
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Advocates of the Act argued that parole was inconsistent 
with both deterrence and a theory of just deserts. The fixed 
guidelines assured punishment commensurate with the 
offender's just deserts. Parole, it was argued, leads to a belief 
among offenders that if sentenced to prison, they will be released 
quickly on parole. The legislative history also demonstrates the 
belief that "almost everyone involved in the criminal justice sys-
tem now doubts that rehabilitation can be induced reliably in a 
prison setting."122 Finally, once indeterminacy was abandoned 
and fixed sentences established, the parole board was no longer 
needed to equalize otherwise unfair sentences that might result 
from misguided or unguided judges acting under the old scheme 
of discretionary sentencing. 123 
In many ways, the federal scheme tracks the scheme pro-
posed by critics of the rehabilitative model. Indeterminate 
sentences and parole are gone. Following the sentencing guide-
lines should lead to less inequality among offenders. 
The guidelines focus on some individual characteristics of 
the offender. 124 This emphasis, however, is distinguished from 
the individualized "treatment" under a rehabilitative model. 
Further, the just-deserts model can be distinguished from the 
disfavored retributive model, which looks only or primarily to 
the harm caused by the offender, in that the just-deserts model 
considers the culpability of the offender. 125 Hence, some individ-
ual characteristics are relevant in assessing the offender's culpa-
bility under the federal scheme, but Congress, like many of the 
critics of the rehabilitative model, rejects the offender's response 
to punishment or to treatment as relevant in determining his 
IMPRISONMENT 18-19 (1985); P. O'DoNNELL, M. CHURGIN & D. CURTIS, TOWARD A 
JUST AND EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM 10-13 
(1977). 
122. S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 38, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & 
ADMIN. NEWS at 3221. 
123. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366-67 (1989); see also A1schu1er, 
Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" 
and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 553 (1978). 
124. For example, the federal sentencing guidelines adjust the sentence according to 
some factors relating to offender culpability, like the individual's role in the specific offense 
and the acceptance of responsibility. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3 (1988). Also relevant is the offender's prior 
criminal history. /d. ch. 4. Some relevant factors are specifically excluded from 
consideration by the court. See id. ch. 5, pt. H (excluding such factors as age, education, 
vocational skills, mental condition, family ties, previous employment record). 
125. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 68-69. 
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release date. 126 
One area in which liberal reformers did not prevail was in 
actual sentence length. Doing Justice, for example, argued that 
one evil resulting from the rehabilitative model was excessive 
incarceration. 127 Although it did not present a precise agenda 
for sentencing, the committee favored alternatives to incarcera-
tion and short periods of incarceration in all but the most serious 
cases if imprisonment was necessary. 128 Because of the proce-
dures used by the federal sentencing commission, sentences 
imposed under the guidelines are roughly equivalent to actual 
sentences served under the preguideline scheme. 129 
B. Other Sentencing Reforms 
The reform movement has had an effect on state sentencing 
practices as well. But in some instances, state legislatures used 
the reformist program to increase sentences. 130 That result prob-
ably could have been anticipated. 131 The reformist movement 
aligned radicals and liberals with conservative critics of rehabili-
tation. Yet the reformist platform, reflected in documents like 
Doing Justice, included important limitations on punishment. 
Once freed from the constraints of the rehabilitative model, law-
and-order proponents could advance their own brand of retribu-
tive justice. Quite predictably, they would urge longer 
sentences. 132 
Law-and-order retributive justice can be seen in numerous 
statutes that impose long sentences for a host of crimes. Legisla-
tures have imposed life sentences for a variety of crimes, 133 and 
they have eliminated all sentencing discretion in other cases, 134 
thereby focusing on the harm, not on the culpability of the 
126. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3624(b) (West Supp. 1990). 
127. Goodell, Preface to A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at xvii. 
128. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 91-94. 
129. See Lindeman, supra note 86, at 559-60. 
130. See R. SINGER, supra note 4, at xvi-xvii, 57-58. 
131. See Clear, supra note 10, at 37-41. 
132. /d. But see R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 58-59 (defending Doing Justice author 
von Hirsch from claim that liberal reformers were partially responsible for trend towards 
longer sentences). 
133. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 37-2732(a)(1)(A) (1977 & Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. 
STAT. § 195.200(1), (4) (Vernon 1978) (repealed 1989) (both permitting life imprisonment 
for distribution of heroin). 
134. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 (West 1989) (mandatory life 
imprisonment for distribution of heroin). 
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offender. 135 They have also relied on sentence enhancement in 
cases in which a crime is committed in a particular manner, 136 
again largely by reference to the harm caused by the offender, 
rather than to the offender's culpability. Legislatures, intent on 
convincing the public that they have gotten tough on crime, 137 
have also combined long sentences with unavailability of parole 
in a variety of contexts. 138 In the recent past, we have also 
witnessed shrinking resources for programs to rehabilitate 
prisoners. 139 
Liberal and radical critics of the rehabilitative model did 
not endorse increased sentences and lack of rehabilitative pro-
grams within prisons. The sources discussed above, while aban-
doning the rehabilitative model as a justification for punishment, 
specifically urged that prison officials retain training and skill 
programs for inmates. 140 
At least in retrospect, the shrinking resources for inmate 
rehabilitation can be traced to the attack on the rehabilitative 
model. While Doing Justice and Struggle for Justice specifically 
urged humane services for inmates, they added to the over-
whelming public perception that rehabilitation did not work. 141 
135. Despite the argument that LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:966 did not allow 
consideration of the culpability of the offender, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held that § 966 does not violate the eighth amendment. See Terrebonne v. 
Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989). 
136. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 84l(b) (West Supp. 1990) (providing for increasing 
penalties depending on amount of drugs involved and on prior convictions of the same 
offense); id. § 845 (increasing penalty if offender distributes controlled substance to person 
under 21 years old); id. § 845(a) (increasing penalty for distribution of controlled substance 
within 1000 feet of school or within 100 feet of a playground). 
137. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 225, supra note 115, at 225, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE 
CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 3437. 
138. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 84l(b) (prescribing mandatory life without release after 
two or more convictions under §§ 841, 845, 845(a) or 845(b)); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 40:966 (West 1989) (mandatory life imprisonment for distribution of heroin). 
139. See, e.g., Glidden, Put Inmates to Work, Make Prisons Produce, L.A. Times, 
Apr. l, 1990, at M4, col. 1 (corrections system is full of retribution without refonn); For the 
Record, Wash. Post, Mar. 8, 1990, at A26 (overcrowded prisons prevent most prisoners 
from developing skills that can make them productive citizens upon release); Imprisonment 
Inequities, Boston Globe, Mar. 3, 1990, at 18 (once incarcerated, prisoner has little hope of 
developing skills); see also Kraar, How to Win the War on Drugs, FORTUNE, Mar. 12, 1990, 
at 70 (attention to "war" on drugs, rather than to prospect of treating drug addiction). 
140. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 99 (urging availability of 
resources to criminal offenders on a voluntary basis). Hirsch has recently argued that 
"(t]he sentencing-guidelines movement has .. . paid relatively little heed to community 
sanctions." Von Hirsch, Wasik, & Greene, Punishments in the Community and the 
Principles of Desert, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 595, 596 (1989). 
141. See Clear, supra note 10, at 26. 
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In the setting of the 1980s, few legislators or prison officials 
would clamor for more rehabilitation in the climate of wide con-
demnation of rehabilitation that we have witnessed. 142 However, 
the central themes of the critique of the rehabilitative model 
were only that the model was a failure and that rehabilitation 
was not a justification of punishment. 143 
Our current situation is disastrous. We have doubled our 
prison population. 144 The current debate centers on whether 
to privatize prisons or whether to invest billions of dollars in 
prison construction. 145 President Bush has urged a major war 
on drugs that will predictably lead to longer prison sentences 
and greater numbers of inmates. 146 Occasionally commentators 
argue that we cannot have a coherent antidrug policy without 
greatly expanded treatment facilities. 147 But most of the discus-
sion is tough talk about making war, not about treating or 
rehabilitating. 148 
In defense of the committees that drafted Doing Justice and 
Struggle for Justice, one might argue that their criticisms have 
been taken out of context-that their reforms have been co-
opted. 149 Had their complete agenda been adopted, we would 
142. That would appear to be one of the lessons of Governor Dukakis's unsuccessful 
presidential campaign. President Bush successfully labelled Dukakis as soft on crime. See 
J. GERMOND & } . WtTCOVER, supra note 2, at 10-12. 
143. See supra text accompanying notes 16-111. 
144. Taylor, Ten Years for Two Ounces, AM. LAW., Mar. 1990, at 65 (federal prison 
population has doubled in the past decade); see also Domanick, A Whole Generation is 
Being Lost, L.A. Times, Mar. 7, 1990, at B7, col. 1 (prison population in California has 
more than tripled in the past decade); McKee, Expert Says Prison Overcrowding Growing 
and Guard Recounts Prison Riots (UPI wireservice, Mar. 7, 1990) (NEXIS, Current file) 
(prison population in Pennsylvania up Ill% in past decade). 
145. See. e.g., Testing the Private Prison Idea, Chi. Trib., Mar. 26, 1990, at 12; 
O'Connor, County Warned of$63-Mi//ion Deficit in the Next 2 Years, L.A. Times, Mar. 14, 
1990, at Bl, col. S; Page, Can We Rent a Social Conscience?, Chi. Trib., Mar. 11 , 1990, at 
C3. 
146. See Remarks of President George Bush (Fed. News Serv., Mar. 19, 1990) 
(NEXIS, Current file); Kraar, supra note 139, at 70 (suggesting alternatives to building 
more prisons); Attorneys General Ask Bush for More Money to Fight Drugs, L.A. Times, 
Mar. 20, 1990, at A16, col. 1; Healy, Pentagon Plans $877-Mil/ion Anti-Drug Effort, L.A. 
Times, Mar. 10, 1990, at A2, col. I. Congress has already responded by increasing 
penalties for various drug violations. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; see 
also Taylor, supra note 144, at 65 (describing case of defendant given mandatory ten-year 
prison sentence for peripheral role in small drug deal). 
147. See, e.g., Kraar, supra note 139, at 70. 
148. See, e.g. , Remarks by President George Bush, supra note 146; Healy, supra note 
146, at A2, col. I. 
149. See, e.g., R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 57-58. Ironically, Struggle for Justice 
observed that earlier reforms have typically been "co-opted" by prison administrators for 
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indeed have had a different landscape from the one we now face. 
My purpose is not to assess blame for the current state of affairs. 
Instead, I want to re-examine the arguments against the rehabili-
tative model and to argue that we should recommit ourselves to 
parole and to rehabilitative programs. 
IV. THE REHABILITATION OF REHABILITATION 
The attack on the rehabilitative model focused on three pri-
mary themes: one, that rehabilitation simply did not work; two, 
that rehabilitation was philosophically unsound; and three, that 
the model led to inequality. In the remainder of this Article, I 
will examine each of those claims and will conclude that we 
should recognize a role in our punishment scheme for rehabilita-
tion and parole. 
A. Rehabilitation May Work 
The literature urging the abandonment of parole and reha-
bilitation argued that rehabilitation did not work. Critics of the 
model frequently cited the works of Robert Martinson in sup-
port of that view. 1so A review of those texts, 1s1 Martinson's sub-
sequent work, 1s2 and more recent studies by other scholars1s3 
demonstrates that opponents of rehabilitation grossly overstated 
the case against rehabilitation. 
Martinson's article What Works? 1s4 was widely cited for 
the view that "nothing works" to reduce criminal recidivism. m 
Martinson's conclusion, however, was not that nothing works, 
but that "[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative 
their own purposes. STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 17. Arguably, that is 
exactly what has happened with recent efforts at sentencing reform. On the nature of the 
political compromise that led to the federal sentencing guidelines, see Breyer, The Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1 (1988). 
150. See sources cited supra note 102. 
151. See generally D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & ]. WILKS, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
CORRECTIONAL TREATMENT: A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION STUDIES (1975); 
Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PuB. INTEREST 
22 (1974). 
152. Martinson, New Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing 
Reform, 7 HoFSTRA L. REv. 243 (1979). 
IS3. See sources cited infra at notes 169-92. 
IS4. Martinson, supra note 1S1, at 48. 
ISS. See Martinson, supra note IS2, at 2S4 ("I protested at the slogan used by the 
media to sum up what I said - 'nothing works.' "). More scholarly sources also quoted 
Martinson for the view that rehabilitation did not work. See sources cited supra note 10S. 
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efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable 
effect on recidivism." 156 That conclusion was drawn from the 
evaluative research that he and his co-authors examined in The 
Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment . m In that work, they 
concluded that "[w]hile some treatment programs have had 
modest successes, it still must be concluded that the field of cor-
rections has not as yet found satisfactory ways to reduce recidi-
vism by significant amounts."158 
By the late 1970s, at a time when Martinson's work had 
become influential in the debate about rehabilitation, Martinson 
retracted the conclusions of his earlier research. In New Find-
ings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing 
Reform, Martinson suggested that a different research procedure 
from that used in his earlier works was necessary. 159 Evaluative 
research, used in Effectiveness, aims to discover causal relation-
ships between particular treatments and rehabilitation by com-
paring the effect of the treatment on an experimental group with 
that of non-treatment on a control group. The researchers did 
not vary the conditions under which the various treatment 
methods were delivered. Both groups received standard process-
ing and the experimental group received some additional form of 
treatment. 160 Martinson originally concluded that treatment 
added to the criminal-justice system did not reduce 
recidivism. 161 
His study in New Findings compared the reprocessing rates 
of groups receiving experimental treatment with groups that 
were similar but that received the standard treatment given to 
the majority of offenders nationwide. 162 The new study was not 
limited to evaluative research, and it included data from all post-
World War II research studies containing a verifiable reproces-
sing rate for a group of ten or more offenders. 163 
156. Martinson, supra note 151, at 25 (emphasis omitted). 
157. D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J . WILKS, supra note 151. 
158. /d. at 627. 
159. Martinson, supra note 152, at 252. 
160. For a description of evaluative research, see D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J . 
WILKS, supra note 151, at 19. 
161. Martinson, supra note 152, at 252-53 (citing D. LIPTON, R. MARTINSON, & J. 
WILKS, supra note 151, at 14-20). 
162. /d. at 253. 
163. /d. at 250. The Effectiveness of Correctional Treatment was based on 
information provided by 231 research studies completed between 1945 and 1967; 
Martinson's article was based on information derived from 555 research studies published 
between 1945 and 1978. Martinson, supra note 152, at 244 n.6, 252. 
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Martinson concluded that no criminal treatment program 
in use was inherently helpful or harmful. 164 In contrast to his 
original works, Martinson was able to examine conditions under 
which treatments had appreciable effects. The new study pro-
vided a reliable indication of the circumstances under which 
treatment may have a substantial effect on reprocessing rates. 
Martinson could thus predict which combinations of treatment 
and other conditions were helpful, harmful, or neutral. 165 
In New Findings, Martinson specifically denounced the 
"nothing works" label often attributed to his writings. 166 Fur-
ther, he urged sentencing reform on the basis of his new find-
ings. 167 Characterizing the movement to abolish parole release 
and supervision as "the most extreme case of radical tinkering 
with the system of criminal justice," he urged that parole super-
vision be extended to more criminal offenders as part of a defi-
nite sentence because "[t]he evidence that parole supervision 
works ... is more convincing than the bare assumption that it 
does not."168 
Martinson's later work was not the only study that contra-
dicted the dismal view of parole and rehabilitation which domi-
nated the discussion about punishment. James Q. Wilson 
criticized Martinson's earlier works for failing to identify pat-
terns that emerged from his data. 169 Wilson argued that some 
offenders are more amenable to treatment than others; hence, 
treatment has a markedly different effect depending on the 
offender's amenability to treatment. 17° Consistent research find-
ings demonstrate that treatment programs tend to make "non-
amenables" commit more crimes than they would have without 
treatment. 171 Martinson's original studies showed no change in 
offenders' behavior because any improvement in those amenable 
to treatment was offset by the increased criminality of nonamen-
able offenders. 172 The success of a rehabilitative program would 
164. Martinson, supra note 152, at 254. 
165. /d. at 257-58. 
166. /d. at 254. 
167. /d. at 258. For a discussion of the correspondence between conditions of 
treatment and patterns of reprocessing, both above and below the mean reprocessing rate 
for standard treatments, see id. at 254-56. 
168. /d. at 257 (emphasis in original). 
169. Wilson, "What Works?" Revisited: New Findings on Criminal Rehabilitation, 61 
PUB. INTEREST 3 (1980). 
170. /d. at 8-9. 
171. /d. at 8. 
172. /d. at 11. 
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depend on the ability of corrections officials to identify amenable 
from nonamenable offenders. 173 
Other researchers criticized Martinson's original works for 
using an inappropriate measure of recidivism. Martinson 
defined "recidivism rate" as "proportion who fail." 174 In a 1979 
study, Charles Murray and Louis Cox contended that a more 
appropriate understanding of recidivism would require focusing 
not just on whether an offender committed an additional offense, 
but also whether an offender continued to commit new crimes at 
the same frequency after contact with the criminal justice 
system. 175 
The Murray and Cox study of juveniles found that about 
eighty percent of the group studied were re-arrested during the 
follow-up period. 176 That rate was not affected by the penalty 
imposed. But re-arrest rates varied significantly. Wilson has 
argued that the Murray and Cox study demonstrates that "how 
strictly the youth were supervised . . . had the greatest effect on 
the recidivism rate" and that "the more restrictive the degree of 
supervision practiced . . . the greater the reduction in arrest 
rates." 177 
Other researchers have been able to identify offenders who 
present a low risk of recidivism. James Bonta and Laurence 
Motiuk have argued for improved classification and identifica-
tion of low-risk offenders for diversion from overcrowded, high-
security facilities into less crowded halfway houses. 178 Their rec-
ommendations were based on Canadian studies that relied on 
Level of Supervision Inventory (LSI), an objective classification 
system. 179 Initially developed in the late 1970s as a parole classi-
fication instrument and later adopted for inmate classification in 
Ontario, the LSI compares favorably to other classification sys-
tems in reliability and validity.180 
Bonta and Motiuk suggested that the correctional system 
173. /d. at 10. 
174. /d. at 11. 
175. C . MURRAY & L. Cox, BEYOND PROBATION: JUVENILE CoRRECTIONS AND 
THE CHRONIC DELINQUENT (1979), reviewed by Wilson, supra note 169, at 10-14. For a 
similar discussion, see D. GLASER, EVALUATION RESEARCH AND DECISION GUIDANCE 
24-26 (1988). 
176. C. MURRAY & L. Cox, supra note 175, at 42. 
177. Wilson, supra note 169, at 13 (emphasis omitted). 
178. Bonta & Motiuk, The Diversion of Incarcerated Offenders to Correctional 
Halfway Houses, 24 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. ~02, 302 (1987). 
179. /d. at 303. 
180. /d. at 305. 
1036 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 
tends to overclassify offenders. 181 Overclassification has an unfa-
vorable effect on low-risk offenders who "show a shift in 
procriminal attitudes and behavior upon exposure to higher-risk 
offenders in institutions."182 Low-risk offenders placed in insti-
tutions ended up with higher re-incarceration rates than similar 
low-risk offenders who were placed in halfway houses. Length 
of incarceration also increased the risk of recidivism. The 
authors concluded that "if we fail to divert low-risk inmates 
from continued imprisonment we may actually increase the risk 
for future recidivism." 183 
Daniel Glaser has made a similar case for the use of actua-
rial statistical guidelines to assist corrections officials in deciding 
inmate placement, in assessing readiness for parole release, and 
in setting the level of supervision during probation and parole. 184 
Glaser found that actuarial statistical research has consistently 
yielded more accurate predictions than those made on the basis 
of individual impressions by agency officials. 185 
The federal sentencing commission rejected many of the 
factors found to be reliable in actuarial statistical research. 186 
Also, unlike the federal scheme, which rejected any post-convic-
tion data, Glaser argued that the method could be used to esti-
mate the probability of an offender's amenability to 
rehabilitative programs, success or failure under reduced super-
vision, readiness for release, and post-release criminality. 187 
Central to the argument against parole was the claim that 
predictions of future dangerousness are notoriously inaccu-
rate. 188 A prisoner's demonstrated change in attitude, which 
may weigh in favor of parole, may "'be merely an insincere 
attempt to curry favor with . . . the Parole Board . . . or just 
another example of a recidivist prisoner's practice of getting 
through a prison sentence . . . quickly and quietly . . . without 
181. /d. at311. 
182. /d. at 312. 
183. /d. 
184. See generally D. GLASER, supra note 175. 
185. /d. at 3, 69-70. 
186. The Federal Sentencing Commission found that a series of factors, like the 
offender's age, education, vocational skills, family ties, and previous employment record 
ordinarily are not relevant to the sentencing decision. UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
CoMM'N, supra note 124, ch. 5, pt. H. Glaser argues that some of those factors are relevant 
in predicting an offender's likely recidivism upon release. D. GLASER, supra note 175, at 
70. 
187. /d. at 70. 
188. See supra notes 77-83, 121 and accompanying text. 
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any real intention of avoiding crime on release.' " 189 In response 
to that criticism, Glaser has argued that periods of reduced 
supervision-like that provided by parole or by incarceration in 
a halfway house-allow for an adequate test to predict future 
criminality. He argues that this is true because "the subject, 
although still somewhat constrained, is exposed to the tempta-
tions and opportunities for misconduct in the free 
community." 190 
Results from Wisconsin's parole system support Glaser's 
argument. Using a set of assessment factors, parole officials 
determine the parolee's risk level and, based on the score, place 
him into a high, medium, or low supervision group. Reported 
crime and misconduct rates declined significantly, even for high-
risk parolees as long as they were strictly supervised.191 Wiscon-
sin parole officials also assess parolees' needs as related to risk of 
recidivism. That scale, developed through extensive consulta-
tion between researchers and experienced agents, was designed 
to determine how well the needs that most affect criminal 
propensities have been met. The study of the Wisconsin system 
suggests that when parolees' needs were met, they were less 
likely to commit additional crimes. 192 
In the early and middle 1970s, based on then-current stud-
ies, one might have argued that rehabilitation was ineffective. 
Efforts at sentencing reform, underway since the 1970s, pro-
ceeded on that assumption. Ironically, by the time Congress 
enacted sentencing reform, new studies were available that 
should have made reformers rethink their attack on rehabilita-
tion. Apart from past mistakes, legislatures and commentators 
ought to rethink the rehabilitation question based on more 
recent studies. More sophisticated research techniques demon-
strate that some offenders are amenable to rehabilitation and 
that social scientists can identify those offenders by use of objec-
tive criteria, at least some of which relate to post-conviction 
behavior. 
189. Metchik, Parole Decisionmaking, 32 INT' L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 233, 243 (1988) (quoting 1979 REPORT OF THE PAROLE BOARD FOR 
ENGLAND AND WALES 32). 
190. D. GLASER, supra note 175, at 151. 
191. /d. at 132. 
192. Id. at 128-30. 
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B. Rethinking the Philosophical Attack on Rehabilitation 
1. Confusion Over the Rehabilitative Model 
I do not intend to canvass all of the different philosophical 
arguments for a just-deserts or retributive model or to assess the 
background assumptions about the criminal law. Instead, even 
conceding the underlying assumptions of the just-deserts model, 
I want to argue that rehabilitation and parole are not inconsis-
tent with that position. 
Apart from grave concerns about the actual performance of 
the rehabilitative model, critics, like the drafters of Doing Jus-
tice, argued that punishment is deserved. 193 Their model, moral-
istic and judgmental, is premised on the argument that actors 
are blameworthy because they are capable of choosing whether 
to commit a crime. 194 That an actor may have great difficulty 
conforming his behavior to the requirements of the criminal law 
because of causes beyond his control does not prevent moral 
condemnation. Condemnation is appropriate as long as the 
actor is capable of rational judgment, even if that judgment is 
overcome during the commission of the offender's crime. 195 
Critics characterized the rehabilitative model as determinis-
tic and medical, inconsistent with the moral judgments of the 
criminal law. Attempts to treat and to cure the "sick" offender 
were seen as misguided efforts based on mercy and leniency.196 
That a person deserved to be punished cast doubt on the moral-
ity of excusing his conduct. 197 Initially, the arguments against 
the rehabilitative model started from the erroneous premise that 
it was synonymous with the medical model that predominated 
during the 1950s and 1960s. In the post-World War II era, the 
"mental hygiene movement" cast rehabilitation in the medical 
framework. 198 But rehabilitation has a much longer history than 
its modem medical variation. 
The debate between proponents of retributive justice and 
rehabilitation has roots dating back at least to the colonial 
period. In Puritan America, the law was used to advance the 
193. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 54, 69-73. 
194. Id. at 44. 
195. See also S. Kadish, supra note 54, at 98-105; Morse, The Twilight of Welfare 
Criminology: A Reply to Judge Daze/on, 49 S. CAL L. REV. 1247, 1248-54 (1976). 
196. See supra text accompanying notes 97-110. 
197. See generally Murphy, Mercy and Legal Justice , in PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 1-14 
(J. Coleman & E. Paul eds. 1987). 
198. F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 5. 
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dominant religious beliefs and to enforce "proper standards of 
moral behavior."199 Based on the Calvinist belief in the innate 
depravity of human beings, the criminal law served to keep peo-
ple from temptation. Punishment was not intended to save the 
criminal; because humans were inherently sinful, only God 
could save them. Punishment served to keep the rest of the com-
munity from temptation. The law, as God's word enacted on 
earth, gave the Puritans the right to represent God's justice by 
punishing criminals. 200 
Quaker views contrasted sharply with the Puritan concep-
tion of the criminal law. Early in our history, the Quakers led a 
movement away from capital and corporal punishment to a sys-
tem of workhouses and prisons. Viewed as grim in retrospect, 
that system was generally enlightened by comparison to earlier 
treatment of criminals. 201 At root, it was based on an optimism 
about human capacity for transformation. 202 
Like proponents of the medical model, Quakers believed 
that crime was the product of society, rather than a result of 
inherent sinfulness. 203 But the method chosen for transforma-
tion was not "treatment." Instead, they believed that the 
offender could be reformed through a process of rationality. 
Freed from the corrupting influences and permitted to reflect on 
moral questions, the offender could be "restored to fellowship 
with God and humanity."204 
Around the time of the American Revolution and the adop-
tion of the Constitution, Quaker idealism was a powerful force in 
penology. It led to the establishment of penitentiaries, first in 
Pennsylvania where Quaker influence was strongest. Modeled 
on monastic prisons of the Middle Ages, the penitentiary used 
solitary confinement, religious instruction, and hard labor to 
facilitate repentance. 205 
Early prison reformers also stressed the community's 
responsibility for corrupting the individual. For example, one 
Boston clergyman inquired, " 'How can it be justice to punish as 
a crime that which the institutions of society render unavoida-
199. G. McHUGH, CHRISTIAN FAITH AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32-33 (1978). 
200. Jd. at 33-34. 
201. FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 85-86. 
202. Id.; see also F. A LL EN , supra note 20, at 13; STRUGGLE FOR JusTICE, supra note 
18, at 16. 
203. G. McHu GH, supra note 199, at 34-35. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 36-39. 
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ble?' "206 Recognition that social conditions were a cause of 
crime did not render society incapable of punishing the offender, 
but it created a moral imperative to offer the offender a chance at 
moral transformation. Nor was the prescription mollycoddling; 
devices that look unabashedly punitive, like hard labor, were 
believed to have the beneficial effect of aiding the transformation 
of the offender. 207 
2. Suffering, Retribution, and Rehabilitation 
Whether public officials ought to adopt one vision of pun-
ishment over another should depend ultimately on the merits of 
the argument. But I want to speculate in this subsection on the 
yearnings that help to explain, if not justify, the attraction of a 
just-deserts or retributive model. Human beings yearn for divine 
or cosmic justice-! think that rehabilitation is based on similar 
hopes. 
Retribution has primitive roots. For example, Paul 
Ricoeur, philosopher and cultural anthropologist, suggests that 
primitive societies saw what he calls defilement, forms of human 
suffering, in moral terms. 208 Pain and suffering in such societies 
are interpreted in quasi-moral terms: "Ethics is mingled with 
the physics of suffering, while suffering is surcharged with ethi-
cal meanings. "209 
Human suffering in our modem view has no obvious rela-
tionship to human intent or to human causality-one may suffer 
a bad fate for no understandable reason. But Ricoeur suggests 
that if suffering and pain are not interpreted as punishment, our 
suffering is meaningless and our world view is without reason or 
control: "When [humankind] first wished to express the order in 
the world, [it] began by expressing it in the language of retribu-
tion."210 The search for moral causality thus preceded the 
search for physical causality. 
Within the religious context, either suffering is related to 
human worth, or God (or the holy reality) is unjust or capri-
cious. The challenge for the faithful is to explain God's good-
206. F. ALLEN, supra note 20, at 14 (quoting H . SACKS & C. LoGAN, DOES PAROLE 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE? 80 (1979) (quoting Boston clergyman T heodore Parker)). 
207. G. McHUGH, supra note 199, at 39-41; see a/so C. T HOMAS, CORRECTIONS IN 
AMERICA: PROBLEMS OF THE PAST AND THE PRESENT 65 ( 1987). 
208. P . RICOEUR, T HE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 26-27 (1967). 
209. Id. at 31. 
210. /d. at 30. 
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ness and at the same time to explain how the evil prosper and 
the just suffer. 211 
This tension is reflected in the Book of Job in which Bildad, 
Job's comforter, responds when Job suggests that his suffering is 
out of proportion to his guilt: 
Does God pervert justice? Or does the Almighty pervert the 
right? If your children have sinned against him, he has deliv-
ered them into the power of their transgression. If you will 
seek God and make supplication to the Almighty, if you are 
pure and upright, then surely he will rouse himself for you and 
reward you with a rightful habitation. 212 
Bildad thus urges that the pure and upright will in fact receive 
rightful habitation. To believe that the just prosper and the 
wicked suffer required that the Israelites deny the reality of 
much of their experience. But if the just prosper, they could 
avoid the conclusion that God was unjust or indifferent to 
human suffering. 
Christianity faces a similar challenge, to explain the death 
of Christ without calling into question the goodness of God. If 
Jesus dies as vicarious punishment for human sin, Jesus's 
message of the loving God is false. Christian thinkers explain 
the death of Jesus in radically different ways. 213 But at a mini-
mum, the event must be explained, as must all suffering, in a 
way that allows order in the world and security and hope: "Man 
confessed this ineluctability [of moral causality in the universe] 
long before he recognized the regularity of the natural order."214 
For many, retribution or just deserts is tied up with that 
desire for moral order. Even if one agrees that Job's fate in this 
life was unjust, there is hope for an accounting in the afterlife. 
211. The same problem, responding to the idea that the evil man prospe~ and the 
just man suffers, must be answered in all religions. For example, the doctrine of "karma," 
the Hindu and Buddhist teaching about moral causality, preserves for Indian thought 
moral rationality in the universe. Suffering in this life is because of evil deeds in a former 
life, and a higher caste in the next life will be the reward for good deeds in this life. The 
need to interpret one's fate in terms of moral causality is a cardinal principle of Hindu 
thought. Pugh, Astrology and Fate: Hindu and Muslim Experiences, in KARMA: AN 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INQUIRY 138 (C. Keyes & E. Daniel eds. 1983). While it helps to 
rationalize the status quo, it must reflect a profound yearning for moral order and justice in 
the universe to have survived in India with such tenacity for 2600 years. 
212. Job 8:3-6 (New Oxford Annotated). 
213. See P. RtCOEUR, supra note 208, at 325; see also Gregson, The Faces of Evil and 
Our Response: Ricoeur, Lonergan, Moore, in RELIGION IN CONTEXT (T. Fallon & P. Riley 
eds. 1988). 
214. P. RICOEUR, supra note 208, at 30. 
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Ricoeur argues that the failure to find meaning in suffering in 
this life led us to look elsewhere for that accounting, "whether at 
the end of history, in a Last Judgment, or in some exceptional 
event, such as the sacrifice of a victim offered for the sins of the 
world."215 He explicitly argues that our retributive penal philos-
ophy comes out of the same need for explaining human 
suffering: 
conscience, not finding the manifestation of the law of retribu-
tion any longer in real suffering, looked for its satisfaction in 
other directions, whether ... by means of penal laws elaborated 
by society with the intention of making the penalty proportion-
ate to the crime, or by means of a wholly internal penalty, 
accepted as penance.216 
The penal law thus parallels our hope for more lasting jus-
tice. While the law has never attempted to reward the good, it at 
least attempts to punish the evildoer according to his deserts. 
Retributive justice is based on the premise that we are free moral 
agents and that punishment is appropriate for wrong moral 
choices.217 At least as early as the twelfth century, that notion of 
punishment was formalized as part of the canon law.218 
A philosophy of just deserts thus responds to one of our 
most profound yearnings: a need to understand human suffer-
ing. But the hope for human transformation, or for our capacity 
to overcome our own failure or sin, is a similarly profound 
theme in religion and philosophy. 
Judaism, for example, "does not overlook the fact ofsin."219 
Because we are not merely part of nature, because we have open 
to us "the infinite and indeterminate possibilities of [our] free-
dom, " 220 we are capable of moral evil, "the dreadful ills inflicted 
by man upon himself and his fellow-men. "221 While recognizing 
that we are finite and flawed, Judaism is not hopelessly 
pessimistic. 
At the core of Judaism is the fellowship between God and 
man. Sin creates a barrier between man and God. 222 But 
through repentance and atonement, we can regain fellowship 
215. /d. at 42. 
216. /d. (emphasis in original). 
217. M. WALZER, EXODUS AND REVOLUTION 83 (1985). 
218. G. McHUGH, supra note 199, at 22. 
219. W . HERBERG, JUDAISM AND MODERN MAN 73 (1951). 
220. /d. at 72. 
221. /d. at 73. 
222. /d. cbs. 8, 11. 
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with God. Salvation in Judaism does not await our death. 22 3 
Instead, it is achieved when we abandon our "delusive self-suffi-
ciency so as to tum to God" and when God gives us "the power 
to break the vicious circle of sin and tum to the divine source of 
[our] being. "224 
Judaism is paradoxical on the nature of salvation, for God 
is both Judge and Father, dispenser of justice and mercy. Two 
recurring questions must be answered. Do we earn God's for-
giveness and grace; that is, God as giver of justice suggests as 
much. Or, as forgiving and loving Father, does God give us His 
grace without regard to our deserts?225 If so, does it cheapen 
God's grace and make it available to the undeserving? The 
answer appears paradoxical or at least involves some mix of 
mercy and justice. The sinner must repent; the sinner must 
overcome the delusion of self-sufficiency and, in that sense, he 
must ready himself for God's grace. But "[i]t is God who 
saves." "In the final analysis, despite the initiative and activity 
required of him, man cannot save himself; .. . God, the divine 
spirit goes out to meet and to purge [the repentant sinner]."226 
The process of atonement is at the core of Judaism. Atone-
ment is a form of new beginning, " 'the creation of a new being, 
a sort of being who is born again, the breaking of the barrier 
between sinful man and his Maker.' " 227 In an honest recogni-
tion of human frailty, Judaism recognizes that once we have 
atoned, we will become self-absorbed again and need to return to 
God's grace. It is a battle that must be constantly refought. 228 
Christian theologians struggle with the same dilemma con-
cerning God's grace. While the concept of redemption is funda-
mental throughout Christianity, denominations and theologians 
differ on how this concept works itself out within the context of 
life on earth. Problems arise when they attempt to develop the 
relationship between grace, redemption, and punishment. 229 
223. /d. at 123-26. 
224. /d. at 121. 
225. /d. at 122-23. 
226. /d. at 123. 
227. /d. at 125 (quoting C. G . MONTEFIORE & H. LoEWE, A RABBINIC ANTHOLOGY 
230 (1938)). 
228. /d. at 126. 
229. For example, early Christianity, influenced by the Old Testament tradition, 
emphasized relationship to the community. It demonstrated concern for the spiritual 
implications of the offense as against the "soul" of the community. The Christian society 
sought the offender's reconciliation with both God and the community. G. McHUGH, 
supra note 199, at 15. Despite Augustine's emphasis on the city of God separate from the 
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Christianity accepts the premise that the individual who 
sins can be reconciled with God and society. The Gospel imper-
ative, to "love one's enemies," implies that to consider someone 
as an enemy is not wrong, and may even be an appropriate 
response to that person's criminal and sinful actions. Nonethe-
less, the concept of enmity implies the possibility of reconcilia-
tion. "[T]o consider people who commit crimes as enemies .. . , 
rather than as 'criminals' . . . , is to presuppose that they and 
society can be reconciled; ... that their relationship can change 
from one of opposition and conflict to one of solidarity and 
peace. " 230 Loving one's enemy does not prevent Christian soci-
ety from punishing the wrongdoer, but rather requires that 
Christians keep open the possibility of the criminal's eventual 
reconciliation with that society. 
Implicit in Jesus becoming a man is the notion that God's 
covenant, the promise of redemption, is open to all humanity. 
In Wolfhart Pannenberg's words, "[t]hrough the message of 
Jesus, God gives to humans the assurance of fellowship with 
him, the fulfillment of their destiny, their salvation. But it is 
basic that he gives it to everyone .... " 231 As in Judaism, that 
fact creates a central tension in Christian doctrine. If redemp-
tion is available to all, it is not earned. 
For some theologians, repentance is a necessary condition 
for redemption. That is how we experience God's grace at work 
in human life. For example, Hendrikus Berkof has argued: 
The knowledge of grace and the knowledge of sin go 
together; they presuppose and reinforce each other. Without 
repentance ... the gospel is changed from a marvelous message 
earthly city, he recognized the relevance of Christianity to decisionmaking in the earthly 
city: " 'Fulfill, Christian judge, the duty of an atfectionate father; let your indignation 
against their crimes be tempered by considerations of humanity ... .'" /d. at 19 (quoting 
Letter from Augustine to Marcellinus (A.D. 412), in 1 The Confessions and Letters of St. 
Augustine, Letter CXXXIII, in Ambrose, Duties of the Clergy, in 10 NICENE AND POST-
NICENE FATHERS 470-71 (P. Schatf & J. Wace eds. 1896)). The judge should not seek 
revenge, but should " 'be moved by the wounds [the otfenders' crimes] have inflicted on 
their own souls to exercise a desire to heal them.' " Jd. Other Christians have not been as 
concerned with the otfender as with social order. While John Calvin believed that the 
purpose of the state and the law was to promote " 'the religious purpose of the maintenance 
of the true religion,'" id. at 25 (substantially quoting 2 E. TROELTSCH, THE SOCIAL 
TEACHING OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCHES 615 (0. Wyon trans. 1931)), punishment did 
not serve a role in redemption because humans were inherently sinful and could be saved 
only by God. Nothing in human experience could bring about redemption. See J. 
GUSTAFSON, THEOLOGY AND CHRISTIAN ETHICS 172-73 ( 1974). 
230. G. MCHUGH, supra note 199, at 148. 
231. W. PANNENBERG, ETHICS 51 (trans. 1981). 
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of liberation into a more or less self-evident ideology of cheap 
grace. If repentance falls away, the amazement and joy over 
God's free grace also fall away.232 
Grace without repentance is "cheap" grace; repentance is "the 
abiding undertone of all the Christian life. "233 Free grace cannot 
be received until individuals have readied themselves through 
repentance. 
Judaism and Christianity must struggle with the same ques-
tion: given universal human frailty, are we capable of salvation? 
Although individual religions often hold out preconditions, like 
membership in their religious group, the possibility of grace is 
open to all. No one can avoid sin. All may repent.234 The avail-
ability of salvation makes religion enormously powerful and 
appealing to its adherents. 
At this juncture, I should make clear that I am not urging 
that our system should give special recognition to prisoners who 
find Jesus or religion during their incarceration. Anyone famil-
iar with prisons knows that "conversions," especially if finding 
Jesus may impress the parole board, are quite common and often 
quite meaningless as a measure of transformation. 235 In fact, 
urging that the state give special recognition to religious conver-
sions would raise obvious establishment clause problems. 
I have attempted instead to demonstrate that the rehabilita-
tive model finds support in many sources other than the modem 
medical deterministic view of behavior. 236 I also have attempted 
to suggest an analogy between the rehabilitative model and the 
powerful religious themes of salvation and redemption. At the 
core of the two predominant religious beliefs in this country is 
the view of man as sinner, yet capable of returning to grace. 237 I 
would like to see that same model preserved within our view of 
punishment. 
232. H. BERKHOF, CHRISTIAN FAITH 433 (trans. 1985) (emphasis omitted). 
233. /d. 
234. See 4 K. BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS: THE DOCTRINE OF RECONCILIATION 
18 (1956). 
235. See STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 88-89 (discussing prisoner 
cynicism and shamming to impress parole officials). 
236. See supra text accompanying notes 198-207. 
237. I have focused on our religious traditions in part because of recent re-assertion 
of those values in our public debate. See Mack, Liberalism, Neutralism, and Rights, in 
RELIGION, MORALITY AND THE LAW 46 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1988). I 
believe that secular humanists demonstrate similar faith in the capacity for human 
transformation and moral development. See, e.g., B. RuSSELL, What is an Agnostic?, in 
BERTRAND RUSSELL ON Goo AND RELIGION 76-77 (A. Seckel ed. 1986). 
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3. A False Dichotomy: Rehabilitation and Just Deserts 
At this point, one might expect a rehabilitation of rehabili-
tation which urges that, even though inconsistent with notions 
of just deserts, retribution should be scrapped in favor of a reha-
bilitative model. I am not going to make that argument. 
Instead, I want to argue for a more modest position: that a 
criminal is transformed through punishment is relevant to how 
much punishment the offender deserves. 
To rehabilitate rehabilitation as a justification for punish-
ment is to answer a different question than the one I want to 
pose in this section of the Article. Much of the criticism of the 
rehabilitative model over the past fifteen years attempted to 
show that it is inappropriate to imprison in order to rehabili-
tate. 238 We imprison in order to punish because the offender 
deserves the punishment. 239 Even if it is inappropriate to incar-
cerate to rehabilitate, it does not follow that we should continue 
to punish the prisoner who demonstrates a transformation. 
Supporters of the just-deserts model suggest that because 
punishment is deserved, relieving an offender from serving part 
of his sentence demonstrates mercy and not justice. 240 Three 
important premises are hidden in that argument: that just 
deserts can be quantified; that mercy may be morally inappropri-
ate; and that a prisoner's response to punishment is irrelevant to 
how much punishment he deserves. 
Prior to the penitentiary movement, when we were willing 
to punish the offender in kind, 241 one might more readily identify 
238. See, e.g., United States v. Bergman, 416 F. Supp. 496, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) 
(emphasis in original): 
The court agrees that this defendant should not be sent to prison for 
"rehabilitation." ... [T]his court shares the growing understanding that no one 
should ever be sent to prison/or rehabilitation. That is to say, nobody who would 
not otherwise be locked up should suffer that fate on the incongruous premise 
that it will be good for him or her. Imprisonment is punishment. . . . But the goal 
of rehabilitation cannot fairly serve in itself as grounds for the sentence to 
confinement. 
239. See A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 66-76. 
240. See, e.g., Gaylin & Rothman, supra note II , at xxxvi-xxxix. 
24 I. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 44-45 (A. Sheridan trans. 1977): 
There was the use of 'symbolic' torture in which the forms of the execution 
referred to the nature of the crime: the tongues of blasphemers were pierced, the 
impure were burnt, the right hand of murderers was cut off; sometimes the 
condemned man was made to carry the instrument of his crime .... 
There were even some cases of an almost theatrical reproduction of the crime 
in the execution of the guilty man-with the same instruments, the same gestures. 
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the punishment deserved by the offender: the eye for an eye 
might make sense at least in a case in which the offender did 
violence to the victim and the offender was lashed in retaliation. 
Even that is problematic. What if, for example, a violent and 
hardened offender emotionally terrorized his victim, but only 
struck her once? Even if we were to accept punishment in kind, 
we would have difficulty determining what the precisely 
equivalent punishment would be. 242 
Obviously, when we imprison in order to punish or use 
other forms of deprivation, the quantification of the deserved 
punishment becomes at best a rough approximation.243 Initially, 
proponents of just deserts and retribution generally disagree on 
what the relevant factors are in assessing the deserved punish-
ment. 244 Once past that difficult assessment, they also disagree 
wildly on the appropriate length of prison sentences.245 Most 
proponents of just deserts, though, recognize that a wide array 
of factors help to determine the deserved punishment. 
Harm alone is an insufficient measure of the punishment 
deserved.246 At a minimum, mens rea is relevant.247 But beyond 
that, our law has traditionally recognized a variety of offender 
characteristics that are relevant to the offender's culpability.248 
242. Even Immanuel Kant, generally associated with a strong retributivist position, 
argued against full equivalency of crime and punishment. Thus in The Philosophy of Law, 
Kant argued that while a murderer should be executed, "[h]is death ... must be kept free 
from all maltreatment that would make the humanity suffering in his person loathsome or 
abominable." I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY Of LAW (W. Hastie trans. 1887), reprinted inS. 
KADISH & S. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 138 (1989). 
243. See L. WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE 217-18 (1987). Responding to 
the argument that retributive theory offers no definite guidelines for determining what 
punishment fits each crime, Weinreb recognizes that desert is "insistently individual." /d. 
at 211. As a result, sentencing laws will necessarily be only dull approximations of the 
desert of each criminal. 
244. See R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 11-34. 
245. /d. at xvi-xvii (discussing different legislative responses to the "commensurate 
deserts" "rallying cry"), 137-94 (reviewing variety of state legislative responses). 
246. /d. at 24-27; see also Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (in assessing whether 
punishment is grossly disproportionate to the offense, the Court considers a balance of the 
harm caused by the offender and the offender's culpability). For a compelling argument 
that the actual harm resulting does not correspond to the offender's blameworthiness, see 
generally Schulhofer, supra note 107. 
247. Professor Singer has argued that mens rea ought to be the controlling question 
on the offender's culpability. He rejects the idea that the law should inquire into additional 
characteristics of the offender. R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 18-24. His views contrast 
sharply with, for example, those of Professor Weinreb, who argues that the process of 
assessing an offender's desert is infinitely complex according to the unique and subtle 
pattern of the offender's personal history. L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 217-18. 
248. L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 217-18. 
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In urging the abandonment of parole, proponents of just deserts 
argued that postincarceration changes were irrelevant to just 
deserts. 249 
One might argue that because we cannot say with precision 
what punishment is deserved, a parole system for rehabilitated 
offenders gives us the flexibility to rethink our earlier, overly 
punitive attitude towards the offender. Early release of the 
offender, however, might appear to be an act of mercy. Some 
proponents of just deserts have argued that such an act of mercy 
is inconsistent with a philosophy of deserved punishment. 250 
Our attitude towards criminal offenders, especially violent 
offenders, has begun to change in part because we have begun to 
hear the voices of their victims more clearly than we once did. 251 
Feminists and others concerned with family violence and vio-
lence directed against women help to identify quite dramatically 
some of the moral concerns raised by forgiveness and mercy 
when we excuse an offender from serving the full punishment 
that he has deserved. 252 
I want to draw an analogy between an abusive spouse and a 
violent offender who, if early release from detention is consid-
ered an act of mercy, is released from custody before he has paid 
his debt and so has not been punished according to his just 
deserts. Within an abusive relationship, the abused wife is usu-
ally faced with increasing episodes of violence. After the first 
violent encounter, the abuser is contrite and promises never to 
harm his wife again. Confronted by the loving mate whom she 
may remember from courtship and whom she is acculturated to 
forgive, she does not leave the marriage, but recommits herself 
to the relationship. In so doing, she has psychologically rein-
forced the abuser's violent behavior.253 At a cognitive level, the 
message to the abuser may be quite cynical. He has devalued his 
wife through victimizing her and he has gotten away with it. 
The abusive spouse has not been punished consistent with 
his just deserts. Violence within the relationship escalates and 
may lead to death. The show of mercy and forgiveness was part 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 59-65, 105-11, 189. 
250. See, e.g., Gaylin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxvi-xxxix. 
25 l. See sources cited supra note 62. 
252. L. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATIERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW 
SOCIETY RESPONDS 42-47 (1989) (describing cycle of violence in battering-spouse 
relationship, including the woman's yearning for rediscovery of the "good" man she 
originally married). 
253. /d. 
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of the cycle of violence. It was morally inappropriate because it 
reflected the lack of value of the abuser's victim. Failing to pun-
ish out of mercy and forgiveness is pragmatically and philosoph-
ically bankrupt in my example. 
In Mercy and Legal Justice, Jeffrie Murphy has argued that 
the exercise of mercy may be immoral.2s4 "To be merciful to a 
person requires not merely that one change how one feels about 
that person but, also, requires a specific kind of action (or omis-
sion) - namely, treating that person less harshly than, in the 
absence of the mercy, one would have treated him."2ss Mercy 
involves the departure from justice and so viewed, is unjust, the 
product of dangerous sentimentality. 2s6 Mercy is also unjust 
when it leads us to treat like cases differently. But factors relat-
ing to an offender's culpability are morally relevant in assessing 
whether we are dealing with like cases. 2s7 
I think that a person's response to punishment is a morally 
appropriate factor in determining how much punishment to 
inflict on the offender. Philosopher Jean Hampton has charac-
terized the relationship between offender and victim as follows: 
By victimizing me, the wrongdoer has declared himself ele-
vated with respect to me, acting as a superior who is permitted 
to use me for his purposes. A false moral claim has been made. 
Moral reality has been denied. 2s8 
Proportionate punishment is important to correct that false 
claim: "retributive punishment is the defeat of the wrongdoer at 
the hands of the victim ... that symbolizes the correct relative 
value of wrongdoer and victim. " 2s9 
If that is the retributivist's understanding of the purpose of 
punishment, he should recognize the relevance of the offender's 
transformation or reform. It suggests that there is no independ-
ent value to compelling a person to submit to a certain amount 
of punishment. Instead, punishment is to serve as a means of 
declaring or realigning relative moral worth. 
I argued above that we make only a rough approximation 
about what punishment fits the crime. 260 But even more impor-
254. Murphy, supra note 197, at 2-6. 
255. !d. at 4. 
256. Jd. at 4-5. 
257. Jd. at 6-7. 
258. Hampton, The Retributive Idea, in FoRGIVENESS AND MERCY 125 (1988). 
259. !d. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 241-45. 
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tantly, if punishment is to serve as a way to re-establish relative 
moral worth of victim and offender, the length of punishment 
may vary according to the offender's response to punishment. 
Even a short period of punishment may bring about the 
offender's recognition of the false moral claim that he has made. 
He may internalize the appropriateness of his being punished 
and may genuinely have atoned for his offense.261 
I offer two possible transformed offenders. Metaphorically, 
the transformed offender becomes a new person. If the offender 
becomes truly a new person, "it is obviously a matter of justice 
that one not [continue to] punish one person for the crime of 
another."262 I do not want to overemphasize the new-person 
metaphor. More probably, transformed prisoners are ones who 
grow up and are now more capable of mature moral reflection. 
They are the same, but a more developed, person. Yet in that 
instance, if the transformation has resulted from incarceration or 
other coercive intervention by the state, the offender has inter-
nalized the recognition of his false moral claim and has earned a 
right to request our forgiveness and mercy.263 To continue to 
impose suffering on a transformed human being seems exces-
261. At this juncture, if we recognize purposes of punishment in addition to 
retribution, we might want to incarcerate an offender past the point of his atonement to 
serve those additional goals. Alternatively, one might want to condition release on parole 
supervision to assure that the offender indeed has genuinely been reformed. My colleague 
David Gruning suggested an interesting dilemma: does a reformed prisoner demonstrate 
his transformation by accepting the justice of his punishment? If so, then how can one 
argue for early release of the offender? I agree that part of our motive in punishing is to 
effect the prisoner's acceptance of his own guilt and the justice of some punishment. But 
that is a separate question from whether he must accept the full punishment, often an 
extremely long term of imprisonment. See, e.g, Terrebonne v. Butler, 848 F.2d 500 (5th 
Cir. 1988) (en bane) (life imprisonment without benefit of parole for distribution of small 
quantity of heroin). 
262. Murphy, supra note 197, at 9. (Murphy, though, expresses suspicion about 
"'new person' talk.") In commenting on a draft of this Article, Professor Schulhofer asked 
whether a court could not then consider a defendant's prior crime after he had become a 
"new person." That the defendant continues to commit crimes may be evidence that we 
were wrong in our assessment that he has become a new person. It is also worth noting 
that the law of evidence (the common-law rule making inadmissible an accused's prior 
criminal acts to show a propensity to commit crime) is premised on the optimistic view of 
our capacity for transformation. The rule has been explained as follows: 
It has to do with the optimistic belief, fundamental in our social system that 
people are not necessarily limited by their past acts, that the criminal can reform, 
and that once a criminal has "paid his debt to society" he should be taken for all 
purposes as an upstanding member of society .... 
R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 219 (2d ed. 1983). 
263. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 255-59. 
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sively cruel. 264 
I have not argued that we impose punishment solely for the 
benefit of the offender. Instead, I have argued that human trans-
formation occurs sometimes in the institutional setting or as a 
result of another less restrictive setting that is nonetheless a form 
of punishment. 265 My argument is that when tranformation 
occurs it is difficult to find a continued justification for imposing 
suffering on that offender. 
C The Problem of Inequality 
One of the most powerful objections to the rehabilitative 
model was that its reliance on indeterminate sentences led to ine-
quality.266 In this section, I must respond to obvious concerns 
that re-introducing consideration of a prisoner's postincarcera-
tion behavior may lead to the same inequity. Critics were con-
cerned about different aspects of inequality. Commentators did 
not urge that the punishment for the same offense must necessar-
ily be the same, but instead they argued that the offender's cul-
pability is relevant to his just deserts. 267 
Once analysis focuses on the culpability of the criminal 
offender instead of exclusively on the harm done, two offenders 
who commit the same crime may appropriately be treated differ-
ently. 268 In effect, we cannot conclude that two offenders have 
been treated unequally until we decide what factors are relevant 
to how much punishment is appropriate. The equality question 
cannot be answered until we resolve the question about why we 
punish. And for those who urge that punishment relates to cul-
pability, punishment will vary from offender to offender.269 For 
264. I think that insight underlies the emotional and moral force of classical tragic 
theater. For example, in Shakespeare's King Lear, reprinted in W. SHAKESPEARE, KING 
LEAR (K. Muir 9th ed. 1972), we first are outraged at his inhumane treatment of his 
daughter Cordelia. But what moves us and makes us grieve Lear's death is that he has 
finally understood and accepted his own moral responsibility. 
265. People who work closely with prisoners and ex-convicts certainly report 
instances of genuine human transformation. See, e.g. , Kell, At S.F. Center, Ex-Cons 
Rebuild Desparate Lives, The Sacramento Bee, Feb. 5, 1990, at I, col. 5; Eig, Board Asks 
Roemer to Spare Killer, The Times-Picayune (New Orleans), Nov. 28, 1989, at Bl, col. 5. 
266. See M. FRANKEL, supra note I, ch. 2; A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 27-32. 
267. See supra text accompanying notes 244-48. 
268. But see R. SINGER, supra note 4, at 18-24, 27-31, 35-39. Singer argues that the 
offender's mens rea is the only relevant consideration to assessing culpability. That is 
hardly the prevailing view. See, e.g., FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 
37-47 (identifying relevant factors). 
269. See, e.g., L. WEINREB, supra note 243, at 211. 
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example, even while abandoning parole, the federal Sentencing 
Guidelines consider whether an offender demonstrates an accept-
ance of responsibility significant. 270 
Most commentators who urged the abandonment of inde-
terminate sentencing recognized that conclusion. 271 Some varia-
tion in sentencing was appropriate, but indeterminate sentencing 
was unequal in part because it had no relationship to just 
deserts. 272 But the most important concern expressed by critics 
of indeterminate sentencing was the arbitrary, unguided discre-
tion given to both sentencing judges and parole boards. 273 
I have argued earlier in this Article that an offender's trans-
formation, like his culpability, is relevant to morally appropriate 
punishment. 274 If that conclusion is sound, then consideration 
of an offender's transformation is not impermissible on equality 
grounds. 
Much of the doubt about using postincarceration behavior 
as a measure of release date turned on doubts about our ability 
to identify genuine human transformation275 and about the bias 
and unfair treatment based on inappropriate factors like the pris-
oner's race. 276 Here, I am cautiously optimistic that we can 
articulate objective standards to guide parole board determina-
tions. As discussed earlier in this Article, research over the past 
270. UNITED STATES SENTENCING CoMM'N, supra note 124, § 3El.l. The Mode) 
Penal Code (MPC) definition of "criminal attempt" offers another illustration when society 
recognizes an offender's conduct, after the commission of the crime, as relevant to the 
amount of punishment he deserves. Indeed, under the MPC approach, a defendant whose 
"conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt" has an affirmative defense if he can 
demonstrate that he made "a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal 
purpose." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(4) (1985). Under the MPC, a defendant is not 
guilty if he has a change of heart immediately after attempting to commit a crime. Under 
the Sentencing Guidelines, he may reduce his punishment if he demonstrates remorse at the 
time of his sentencing. But by abandoning the opportunity for parole, society rejects the 
relevance of a prisoner's change of heart when it comes later rather than earlier in the 
proceedings. 
271. See, e.g. , M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, ch. 9 (urging weights to be given to a wide 
range of relevant factors); FAIR AND CERTAIN PUNISHMENT, supra note 4, at 37-48 
(examination of the crime of armed robbery to demonstrate factors relevant to assessing 
punishment); A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 80-82 (discussing some considerations 
relevant to offender culpability). 
272. See, e.g. , Gay lin & Rothman, supra note 11, at xxxix. 
273. M. FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 103-04 (suggesting that indeterminate sentencing 
as administered was sufficiently arbitrary to raise due process concerns). 
274. See supra text accompanying notes 262-64. 
275. A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 4, at 19-26 (raising concerns about ability to predict 
future dangerousness). 
276. See, e.g., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 71-72 (criminal justice 
system is dominated by racism and cultural and class bias). 
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decade suggests that our earlier conclusions about recidivism, 
parole, and rehabilitation were unnecessarily pessimistic. A 
growing literature suggests that actuarial statistics lead to 
acceptably accurate predictions about an offender's likely 
recidivism. 277 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
I believe that rethinking rehabilitation and parole is timely. 
Popular perception about our need for severe punishment may 
reduce the political will for reform. But faced with the unac-
ceptable cost of creating new prison facilities, we may be ready 
to consider a wide variety of alternatives to bricks and mortar. 
I have not urged that we merely forget the debate of the 
past twenty years and re-introduce a medical, rehabilitative 
model. Instead, I have tried to rehabilitate rehabilitation and 
parole within the confines of the just-deserts model that is widely 
accepted today. Conceding that the criminal law is moralistic 
and judgmental, I have argued that the primary arguments 
against the rehabilitative model must be rethought. 
First, insofar as the model was rejected because of the 
widely held belief that rehabilitation did not work, more recent 
research suggests that position was wrong. Earlier researchers 
were asking the wrong questions. More subtle examination of 
the data suggests that some programs do work well and that 
more sophisticated criteria are available to determine who may 
benefit from different kinds of rehabilitative programs. 
Second, even if rehabilitation works, we might rightly reject 
it if it is morally or philosophically inappropriate. I have 
attempted to demonstrate that transformation or atonement, at 
the core of our religious traditions, does relate to how much 
punishment should be meted out to an offender. 
Third, equality is not offended if we determine the amount 
of punishment deserved based on morally relevant criteria. If 
my second conclusion is correct, then it is appropriate to treat 
two offenders differently depending on their response to punish-
ment. I have also argued tentatively that new research properly 
implemented as parole guidelines will allow parole decisions to 
be made objectively and without discrimination. 
Finally, I want to urge a return to the optimism of earlier 
reformers who believed in human goodness and capacity for 
277. See supra text accompanying notes 179-85. 
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transformation. I do not urge that all offenders are capable of 
reform, but I would urge us to return to criminal offenders hope 
that their own efforts in prison can lead to renewal. 
